

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 106128 TOSEC 040145

FOR ATHERTON FROM DUBS

FOLLOWING REPEAT ISLAMABAD 4671 ACTION SECSTATE INFO LAHORE  
NEW DELHI DACCA KABUL TEHRAN ANKARA MOSCOW CINCPAC MAY 7.

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 4671

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PK, PFOR  
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF BHUTTO'S SPEECH

### SUMMARY

A WEEK AFTER BHUTTO'S APRIL 28 SPEECH ALLEGING A  
USG CONSPIRACY TO OUST HIM, IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY  
EVIDENT THAT IN MAKING HIS SENSATIONAL ACCUSATIONS  
THE PM WAS MOTIVATED BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNNS  
AND DID NOT CONCEIVE OF HIS SPEECH AS THE FIRST MOVE  
IN A SIGNIFICANT REVAMPING OF PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY.  
WE MUST RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT BHUTTO MAY NOT BE ABLE  
TO FULLY CONTROL AND FINE TUNE THE CAMPAIGN HE HAS  
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UNLEASHED. THE APPROACH WE BELIEVE BHUTTO  
PREFERS IS TYPICAL OF HIS POLITICAL TECHNIQUE, WHICH  
IS TO DEAL IN TERMS OF SHORT TERM GOALS. WE THINK IT  
LIKELY THAT IN CONSIDERING THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS  
OF HIS BLAST THE PRIME MINISTER PROBABLY GAVE SOME THOUGHT  
TO WHAT HE MIGHT DO IF A COMBINATION OF TOUGH AMERICAN  
REACTION AND HIS OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS LED TO  
A SERIOUS AND POSSIBLY IRREVERSIBLE EROSION OF PAK-US  
RELATIONS. THIS MIGHT INCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF CLOSER  
SECURITY TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND AN ENHANCED ROLE

FOR BHUTTO AND PAKISTAN IN THE THIRD WORLD.

THESE CONTINGENCY CONSIDERATIONS PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO BHUTTO'S DECISION TO SINGLE OUT THE US, RATHER THAN OTHER POTENTIAL TARGETS, FOR ATTACK. THERE ARE MANY OTHER REASONS WHY HE CHOSE THE US. THESE MAY HAVE INCLUDED AN ASSESSMENT ON HIS PART THAT THINGS WERE GOING DOWNHILL IN PAK-US RELATIONS, SO THAT NOT MUCH HARM WOULD RESULT FROM A FURTHER SHOVE. A NUMBER OF REASONS CAN BE CITED WHY BHUTTO CHOSE NOT TO INVOLVE THE SOVIETS. IT IS STILL POSSIBLE, THOUGH WE THINK UNLIKELY, THAT THE PAKS WILL EXPAND THEIR CHARGES TO INCLUDE THE USSR. THAT THE OLD INDIAN BOGEY WAS NOT RAISED MAY STEM FROM UNCERTAINTY ON BHUTTO'S PART ABOUT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN DELHI'S REACTION TO SUCH ALLEGATIONS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GOP'S DECISION NOT TO SEND FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED TO THE CENTO MINISTERIAL NEXT WEEK FLAWS OUR THESIS. END SUMMARY

1. A WEEK AFTER BHUTTO'S APRIL 28 SPEECH ALLEGING A USG CONSPIRACY TO OUST HIM, IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT IN MAKING HIS SENSATIONAL ACCUSATIONS THE PRIME MINISTER WAS MOTIVATED BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNs AND DID NOT CONCEIVE OF HIS SPEECH AS THE FIRST MOVE IN A SIGNIFICANT REVAMPING OF PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY. WE THINK IT LIKELY THAT IN CONSIDERING THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF HIS BLAST THE PRIME MINISTER PROBABLY

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GAVE SOME THOUGHT TO WHAT HE MIGHT DO IF A COMBINATION OF TOUGH AMERICAN REACTION AND HIS OWN DOMESTIC REQUIREMENTS LED TO A SERIOUS AND POSSIBLY IRREVERSIBLE DEOSION OF PAK-US RELATIONS. BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HE WANTS SUCH A BREAK. WE THINK THAT HE WOULD PREFER THAT THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF HIS SPEECH AND THE PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE WHICH HAS FOLLOWED IT BE LIMITED IN BOTH SCOPE AND DURATION PROVIDED THAT THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH HIS PRIMARY DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNs.

2. WE MUST RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT BHUTTO MAY NOT BE ABLE TO FULLY CONTROL AND FINE TUNE THE CAMPAIGN HE HAS UNLEASHED. IN HIS WEAKENED INTERNAL POSITION, PRESSURES FROM HIS OWN SUPPORTERS AND THE NEWLY REAWAKENED LEFT COULD FORCE HIM TO TAKE ANTI-AMERICAN STEPS HE MIGHT PREFER TO AVOID. FURTHERMORE, THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT THE OPPOSITION PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE COULD CHALLENGE BHUTTO TO "PUT HP OR SHUT UP" ON HIS CHARGE OF US INTERVENTION BY TAUNTING THE PM WITH THOSE MEASURES HE HAS NOT TAKEN, E.G. EXPULSION OF AMERICANS, A RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AND WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTO.

3. THE APPROACH WE BELIEVE BHUTTO PREFERS IS TYPICAL OF THE MAN. AS WE HAVE OBSERVED MAHY TIMES, BHUTTO, FOR ALL HIS

TALK OF ENDURING PRINCIPLES, THINKS PRINCIPALLY IN TERMS OF SHORT RANGE GOALS.

LONGER TERM IMPLICATIONS OF HIS MANEUVERS ORDINARILY TAKE A BACK SEAT TO THE NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. THIS APPROACH IS MOST EVIDENT WHEN HE FACES A CRISIS SITUATION AND THE NEED FOR THE PRAGMATIC, AUDACIOUS, AND SKILLFUL POLITICAL MANEUVERS FOR WHICH HE HAS SO JUSTIFIED A REPUTATION IS MOST PRESSING.

4. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE APRIL 28 TEND TO SUPPORT THIS THESIS. THE PM FOLLOWED UP HIS SPEECH WITH SOME IMPROMPTU BARN-STORMING THROUGH THE STREETS OF RAWALPINDI WHEN HE WAVED  
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THE SECRETARY'S LETTER AND GAVE THE CROWDS A DISTORTED VERSION OF IT, BUT SINCE THEN HE HAS REMAINED SILENT. HIS GOVADNMENT AND PARTY FOLLOWERS CONTINUE TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE US CONSPIRACY. BUT ACCOUNTS OF THESE AND OTHER

ANTI-AMERICAN MANIFESTATIONS CARRIED IN THE KEPT PRESS HAVE GENARALLY DIMINISHED IN INTENSITY AND VOLUME OVER THE PAST WEEK. WE HVE BEEN TOLD AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT BHUTTO WISHES TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH US, AND HE HAS TAKEN NO MEASURES AGAINST US HERE THAT NEED PRODUCE AN IRREVOCABLE DECLINE IN OUR TIES. THERE HAVE BEEN NO EXPULSIONS, NO MAJOR DEMONSTRATIONS. THIS COULD CHANGE, OF COURSE, IF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS MADE MORE STRIDENT AND PROVOCATIVE MOVES NECESSARY IN HIS CALCULATION. BUT AS OF THIS TIME, ANTI-AMERICANISM IS CLEARLY BEING KEPT UNDER CAREFUL CONTROL.

5. WE MENTIONED ABOVE THE PROBABILITY THAT BHUTTO HAS GIVEN SOME THOUGHT TO THE NEW DIRECTION HE MIGHT GIVE TO PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY IF IT PROVED NECESSARY TO BREAK MORE DRAMATICALLY WITH THE US. SUCH A REALIGNMENT, IT SEEMS TO US, WOULD SEEK BOTH TO COMPENSATE FOR THE WEAKENING OF PAK-US RELATIONS AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. COMPENSATION COULD TAKE THE FORM OF CLOSER SECURITY TIES WITH THE SOVIETS, THOUGH IN MAKING SUCH A MOVE BHUTTO WOULD RECOGNIZE THAT HE WAS RUNNING THE RISK OF DAMAGING HIS IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIPS WITH IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND THE PRC. HE COULD ALSO NOT BE CERTAIN WHAT RECEPTION HIS APPROACH WOULD RECEIVE IN MOSCOW ANXIOUS TO PRESERVE WHAT IT CAN OF ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA, NOR COULD HE BE SURE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO PAKISTAN'S PLAYING A ROLE IN SOUTH ASIA CONSISTENT WITH BHUTTO'S POLICIES (I.E. ONE WHICH DOES NOT INVOLVE PAKISTAN'S ACCEPTING INDIAN PREEMINENCE IN THE SUBCONTINENT.) THE ADVANTAGES ACCRUING FROM A BREAK WITH THE  
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US FOCUS ON AN ENHANCED ROLE FOR BHUTTO AND PAKISTAN IN THE THIRD WORLD WHERE, AS THE PRIME MINISTER NO DOUBT BELIEVES, STRIDENT ANTI-AMERICANISM CAN BE A HELPFUL BOOST TO ONE'S ASPIRATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP. BHUTTO'S TALENTS EMINENTLY QUALIFY HIM FOR SUCH A LEADERSHIP ROLE, AND THOUGH HIS CONTINUING TROUBLES AT HOME COULD INHIBIT HIS PLAYING IT TO THE EXTENT HE WOULD RELISH, HE WOULD WELCOME IT NONETHELESS, NOT LEAST BECAUSE HE WOULD SEE IT AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PERSONAL AND POLITICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS DIVERSION FROM DOMESTIC CONCERNS.

6. THESE CONTINGENCY CONSIDERATIONS PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO BHUTTO'S DECISION TO SINGLE OUT THE US, RATHER THAN OTHER POTENTIAL TARGETS, FOR ATTACK. THERE ARE MANY OTHER REASONS WHY HE CHOSE THE US. HE MAY WELL HAVE SUSPECTED THAT THE US LOOKED KINDLY ON HIS OPPONENTS AND MAY HAVE ACCEPTED AT LEAST SOME OF THE DISTORTED ACCOUNTS OF US OFFICIALS' CONTACTS WITH OPPOSITION PERSONALITIES AND SUPPORTERS FED TO HIM BY HIS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND OTHERS CHARACTERISTIC SELF-SERVING FASHION. BHUTTO IS, AFTER ALL, AS CAUGHT UP IN THE CONSPIRACY THEORY OF POLITICS AS OTHER PAKISTANIS. THE WIDELY CREDITED AND LONG STANDING SPECULATION THAT ASGHAR KHAN IS A PARTICULAR AMERICAN FAVORITE MAY ALSO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS SUSPICIONS, ESPECIALLY WHEN ASGHAR EMERGED DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AS THE LEADING FIGURE IN THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE (AND THE MOST IMPLACABLY ANTI-BHUTTO). WE DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT BHUTTO ACCEPTS THE CHARGE THAT THE US MASSIVELY INTERVENED IN THE PAKISTAN POLITICAL PROCESS IN FAVOR OF HIS OPPONENTS. (IF HE DOES, HE IS DERANGED, AND THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE).

7. BEYOND THESE CONSIDERATIONS, BHUTTO MAY ALSO HAVE CALCULATED THAT HE HAD LITTLE TO LOSE IN A CONTRE-TEMPS WITH THE US AT THIS TIME. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO  
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COUNTRIES HAD ALREADY SOURED OVER THE REPROCESSING PLANT ISSUE AND COULD GET WORSE ON THAT SCORE IF THE US TOOK ACTION UNDER THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS WAS LIKELY TO BECOME ANOTHER SOURCE OF FRICTION. THE PM MAY ALSO HAVE HAD IN MIND THE CONVENTIONAL SUBCONTINENTAL WISDOM THAT US SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN GENERALLY WEAKENS UNDER DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIONS, WHICH HAVE IN THE PAST SEEMINGLY PREFERRED INDIA, AND THAT THE ADVENT OF PRESIDENT CARTER THEREFORE FORESHADOWED A DECLINE IN PAK-US TIES. IN SHORT, IN BHUTTO'S VIEW THINGS WERE GOING DOWNHILL IN PAK-US RELATIONS, AND NOT MUCH HARM WOULD RESULT FROM A FURTHER SHOVE.

8. SOME FOREIGN DIPLOMATS HERE HAD ANTICIPATED THAT DESPITE RUMORS PERSISTING FROM EARLY IN THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF US FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE OPPOSITION, BHUTTO WOULD PUBLICLY CHARGE THE SOVIET UNION WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUNDING AND OTHERWISE SUPPORTING HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS. (ONE CAN EASILY IMAGINE HIS SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS NOT ONLY BACKED THE PNA BUT SOUGHT TO UPSET PAK-US RELATIONS BY SPREADING REPORTS THAT THE US WAS DOING SO.) IT IS STILL POSSIBLE, THOUGH WE THINK UNLIKELY, THAT THE PAKS WILL EXPAND THEIR CHARGES TO INCLUDE THE USSR, AND FOREIGN SECRETARY AGHA SHAHI HAS HINTED THAT THIS MAY BE DONE. THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT MADE THE PRIMARY PAK TARGET MAY STEM FROM THE ABSENCE OF "EVIDENCE" OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT WITH THE PNA, THE LIKELIHOOD IN PAK EYES THAT THEIR REACTION TO SUCH ALLEGATIONS WOULD BE SHARPER AND MORE THREATENING THAN THE USG'S WOULD BE, AND THE PROBABILITY THAT A CLAIM THAT THE USSR WAS CONSORTING WITH AN OPPOSITION BRANDED BY BHUTTO AS REACTIONARY, CAPITALIST, AND FEUDALIST WOULD BE LESS CREDIBLE THAN THE ALLEGATION THAT THE US WAS IN LEAGUE WITH IT. BHUTTO MAY ALSO HAVE HAD IN MIND THAT IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD AN ANTI-US LINE WOULD BE USEFUL IF HE CHOSE TO SWING LEFTWARD ONCE AGAIN (ON THE THEORY THAT HIS MODERATE POSTURE OF RECENT YEARS DID NOT PAY OFF AT THE POLLS AND A  
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RETURN TO THE SUCCESSFUL RADICAL APPEALS OF 1970 WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FORMULA FOR REGAINING LOST SUPPORT.) AND ANTI-SOVIET APPROACH WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT FIT IN WITH SUCH CALCULATIONS.

9. INDIAN EMBASSY OFFICERS HERE HAVE EXPRESSED APPREHENSION THAT BHUTTO'S INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY CAMPAIGN MAY IN TIME BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE CHARGES OF INDIA'S INVOLVEMENT, PERHAPS AS AN ALLEGATION OF INTRIGUE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND NEW DELHI. THEY PROFESS TO BE SOMEWHAT SURPRISED THAT THE OLD INDIAN BOGEY HAS NOT YET BEEN TROTTED OUT. WE SUSPECT THAT IN CHOOSING TO IGNORE THE INDIANS, BHUTTO MAY HAVE BEEN APPREHENSIVE ABOUT THE RESPONSE WHICH ALLEGATIONS OF AN INDIAN CONSPIRACY MAY HAVE AROUSED IN NEW DELHI. THE RATHER UNDERSTANDING, ALMOST COSY RELATIONSHIP BHUTTO USED TO ENJOY WITH MRS. GANDHI IS GONE, AND THE GOP MUST NOW DEAL WITH A GOVERNMENT SOME OF WHOSE LEADERS HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDES TOWARD PAKISTAN. AS BHUTTO MAY HAVE SEEN IT, THE DESAI GOVERNMENT MAY NOT HAVE DISMISSED HIS CHARGES AS MERELY THE PRODUCT OF HIS DOMESTIC POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS (AS HE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CONFIDENT MRS. GANDHI WOULD DO) AND WOULD INSTEAD CHOOSE TO CONFRONT PAKISTAN IN WAYS BHUTTO WOULD FIND UNCOMFORTABLE AT BEST.

10. IN THE THESIS WE HAVE DEVELOPED ABOVE, WE HAVE NOT MENTIONED THE GOP'S DECISIONS RELATING TO THE UPCOMING CENTO MINISTERIAL

MEETING IN TEHRAN. IN DISCUSSING WITH THE CHARGE THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED WOULD NOT ATTEND THE MEETING (THE PAK DELEGATION WILL BE HEADED BY ITS AMBASSADOR TO IRAN WHO WILL HAVE ONLY A WATCHING BRIEF), FOREIGN SECRETARY AGHA SHAHI STATED THAT "IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR PARTICIPATION IN CENTO WOULD BE SELF-CONTRADICTORY." THIS MORNING'S PAKISTAN TIMES HEADLINES AN ARTICLE BY H.K. BURKI IN WHICH HE WRITES THAT THE GOP'S DECISION NOT TO SEND AHMED IS "THE FIRST CONCRETE EXPRESSION OF ITS RESENTMENT AT THE MASSIVE AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN ITS INTERNAL CONFIDENTIAL

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AFFAIRS." BURKI'S CONCLUSION IS THAT ONE OF THE SIGNIFICANT FEATURES IN THE DECISION IS THAT "DEPENDING ON THE WAY THE SITUATION DEVELOPS, (AZIZ AHMED'S NON-ATTENDANCE) COULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS A COMPLETE PULL-OUT FROM THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION." PAKISTAN'S EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SEATO, HE RECALLS, HAD BEGUN WITH NON-PARTICIPATION IN ITS MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. GIVEN BURKI'S PIPELINE TO THE SENIOR LEVELS OF MFA AND HIS FREQUENT USE AS AN UNOFFICIAL SPOKESMAN OF FOREIGN OFFICE VIEWS, WE CAN ASSUME THAT THIS ARTICLE REFLECTS GOP OPINION.

11. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CENTO AFFAIR FLAWS OUR THESIS. IT IS NOTABLE THAT IN HIS DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF PAKISTAN'S WITHDRAWAL CENTO, THE ORDINARILY INCAUTIOUS BURKI IS VERY CAREFUL TO QUALIFY HIS ASSESSMENT, NOT SURPRISINGLY IF, AS WE BELIEVE, THE GOP WOULD ONLY DECIDE TO LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION IF IT COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT ITS EXIT WOULD NOT DISTURB ITS IMPORTANT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SHAH. (THERE IS NO EVIDENCE HERE THAT THE PAKS HAVE PROBED THE IRANIANS ABOUT THIS AT THIS TIME, AND A SENIOR OFFICER OF THE IRANIAN EMBASSY HAS TOLD US HE WAS COMPLETELY SURPRISED BY THE AZIZ AHMED DECISION.) PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, WE THINK A STRONG CASE COULD BE MADE THAT IF THE PAKS DO CONCLUDE THAT THEY SHOULD LEAVE CENTO AND CAN SAFELY DO SO WITHOUT OFFENDING THEIR IMPERIAL PATRON, THAT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY SIGNIFY A MAJOR RE-ORDERING OF PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY TO A MORE ANTI-US STANCE. THE PROPOSAL TO LEAVE THE ORGANIZATION IS AFTER ALL AN OLD ONE, RAISED BY BHUTTO IN 1970, STUDIED FROM TIME TO TIME BY MFA, AND INCLUDED IN THE PNA'S PLATFORM IN THIS YEAR'S CAMPAIGN. IF IT DOES TAKE PLACE IT MIGHT BE VIEWED MORE PROPERLY AS A MOVE DESIGNED FURTHER TO BURNISH BHUTTO'S THIRD WORLD CREDENTIALS AND PERMIT PAKISTAN TO ENTER THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, NOT AS A RUPTURE WITH THE US. IT WOULD BE USEFUL MINIMAL RESPONSE TO THE CONFIDENTIAL

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UPROAR THE GOP HAS ITSELF TRIGGERED. CONSTABLE UNQUOTE  
CHRISTOPHER

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